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FEDERALISM IN THE ALGORITHMIC AGE
CHAD SQUITIERI†
NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE OF AI. BY
FRANK PASQUALE. HARVARD: BELKNAP PRESS. 2020. PP. 344. $29.95.

INTRODUCTION
The robots will not be pleased with Frank Pasquale. In New Laws
of Robotics, the Brooklyn Law professor outlines two possible futures that
can emerge from a growing conflict between human and robotic thought.
The first is a future of robotic dominance. In that future, decisions
traditionally made by human professionals (e.g., who goes to jail, what
medicines are prescribed, and what news gets published) are decided by
robots powered by artificially intelligent algorithms. The second future
offers robots a less-favored role in the ordering of human affairs. Pasquale
earns the displeasure of our would-be robotic overlords by outlining the
path to this second future, where human professional judgment is
enhanced by (but not replaced with) robotic systems.
The second future may seem too obvious a preference to merit a
book-length discussion. Humans, after all, might be presumed to
instinctively work towards a future where human thought prevails. But as
Pasquale observes, economics make the first future appear attractive—at
least in the short term (p. 172).1 Robots have no need for vacation days,
lunch breaks, or even sleep. Robots do not call in sick, nor do they ask for
pay raises. Given as much, companies will increasingly have short-term
incentives to replace costly human labor with less costly robotic systems.
Cash-strapped governments face a similar calculus, too. It may one day
be cheaper, for example, for governments to reimburse a fleet of robotic
caregivers than a team of human nurses.
Of course, succumbing to the short-term incentives afforded by
automation can lead to disastrous societal effects in the long run.
Companies may find it difficult to sell their widgets if would-be consumers
have been forced out of work on a widespread basis (pp. 188–89). And
governments might find their fiscs emptier yet if citizens with taxable
wages are replaced by tax-deductible machines (p. 26).2 Thankfully,
†

The views expressed in this Review are mine alone, and should not be attributed
to my employer. I would like to thank Frank Pasquale, Matthew P. Sappington,
and the editors of the Duke Law & Technology Review for helpful feedback on
earlier drafts of this Review.
1
All in-text citations in this Review are citations to New Laws of Robotics.
2
See also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 426–27 (2017) (“Robots do not pay taxes. . . .

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

140

humans have developed a system (i.e., political governance) capable of
producing outcomes (i.e., laws) that can alter short-term incentives to
advance society’s long-term goals.
Thus enters Pasquale’s four new laws of robotics.3 Collectively
his laws aim to structure how human professionals incorporate artificially
intelligent robots into their workplaces (pp. 3, 12–13). The goal is to
ensure that professional judgment is exercised by disperse sets of humans
with localized knowledge, not robots powered by algorithms that are
centrally developed and controlled (pp. 4, 178). Pasquale’s four new laws
of robotics provide as follows:
1. Robotic systems and artificial intelligence (“AI”)
should complement professionals, not replace them
(p. 3);
2. Robotic systems and AI should not counterfeit
humanity (p. 7);
3. Robotic systems and AI should not intensify zerosum arms races (p. 9); and
4. Robotic systems and AI must always indicate the
identity of their creators, controllers, and owners (p.
11).
Pasquale applies these four laws in dozens of case studies. Each
case study illustrates the harms his laws are intended to prevent—i.e., the
harms associated with centralizing professional judgment in the small
group of roboticists and computer scientists responsible for developing
and controlling advanced decision-making algorithms.
The education industry offers one such case study. In the near
future, teachers may be required to cede decision-making authority to
algorithms capable of running hyper-efficient classrooms (p. 176). By
reviewing classroom video from all over the world, a centralized algorithm
could analyze student behavior (such as puzzled looks and questions) to
craft the perfect lecture (pp. 60, 75). One can imagine the benefits of
utilizing such an algorithm to improve educational outcomes—
particularly for students who might not otherwise have access to premiere
[P]olicymakers will have to figure out how to keep the lights on in the absence of
. . . income taxes.”).
3
Pasquale’s “new laws” are a play on the three laws of robotics proposed in 1942
by science fiction writer Isaac Asimov (p. 2). In short, Asimov’s three laws
provide: (1) a robot may not injure a human; (2) a robot must obey a human’s
order, unless it conflicts with the first law; and (3) a robot must protect its own
existence, unless it conflicts with the first or second law. ISAAC ASIMOV,
Runaround, in I, ROBOT 41, 53 (1950).
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educators. But harnessing those benefits requires subjecting students to
increased surveillance. And students, cognizant of such surveillance,
might change their behavior in unhelpful ways—failing to ask clarifying
questions or express confusion, less the algorithm label them “problem
kid[s]” unfit for certain colleges or occupations (p. 74). Further,
centralized algorithms might fail to appreciate peculiarities for which
human teachers readily account. Where an algorithm might schedule an
afternoon multiplication lesson, a human teacher might recognize the need
to reschedule the lesson when unseasonably warm weather makes it
difficult for fidgety students to concentrate (p. 6).
Pasquale’s book is critical reading for those interested in
addressing the harms and benefits of the coming algorithmic age.4 But if
there is a critique to be made, it is that Pasquale offers little detail as to
who is to enforce his new laws of robotics. Moreover, when he does offer
detail, he appears to rely too heavily on federal regulators.5 In suggesting,
for example, that his laws be enforced by “independent agencies,” such as
those created in “the New Deal,”6 the book does not fully account for the
critical role state governments play in shaping workplaces and
professional responsibilities.
In this Review, I argue that while New Laws of Robotics
presciently outlines the harms associated with centralizing professional
decision-making authority, it remains silent (at best) as to the harms
associated with centralizing governmental decision-making authority.
This is notable because the two categories of harms share much in
common.
Like how centralizing professional judgment can create an
unacceptable “mental monoculture” (p. 178), so too can centralizing
governmental authority. Notable efforts (such as Pasquale’s) to prevent
the centralization of professional judgment should be careful to avoid an
unnecessary centralization of governmental authority. Any success in
maintaining a world of disperse sources of professional knowledge will be
short-lived if it comes at the cost of policing professionals with single sets
of requirements established by the federal government.

4

See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017) (referring to a coming “society organized around social
and economic decision-making by algorithms, robots, and [artificially intelligent]
agents, who not only make the decisions but also, in some cases, carry them out”).
5
See infra Part I.B.
6
Eric Allen Been, Asimov’s Three Laws Helped Shape A.I. and Robotics. We
Need Four More, ONEZERO (Nov. 17, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/itstime-to-add-4-new-laws-of-robotics-8791139cdb11 (interview with Frank
Pasquale discussing The New Laws of Robotics).
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I. TWO CATEGORIES OF HARMS
In Part I of this Review, I address two categories of harms. First
is the category attributable to a centralization of professional decisionmaking authority. Second is the category attributable to a centralization
of governmental decision-making authority.
Pasquale dutifully describes the first category, which can arise
when professional decision-making authority is shifted from disperse sets
of human professionals to algorithms that are centrally developed and
controlled. But Pasquale does not account for the second category of
harm, which can arise when governmental decision-making authority is
shifted from state governments to the centralized federal government. In
failing to address the harms associated with centralized governmental
authority, Pasquale risks undermining his arguments regarding the harms
associated with centralized professional authority.

A. Centralized Professional Decision-Making Authority
Pasquale frames his discussion of the harms associated with a
future of centralized robotic decision-making by outlining the economic
incentives that might bring such a future into fruition.7 In “[f]ield after
field,” employers face a temptation to replace costly human workers with
relatively cheaper robots (p. 26). Replacing human labor can provide
some benefits—namely, cheaper services (id.). “If I can replace my
dermatologist with an app and my children’s teachers with interactive
toys,” Pasquale writes, “I have more money to spend on other things” (id.).
And “[t]he same goes for public services; a town with robot police officers
or a nation with drone soldiers may pay less taxes to support their wages
and health care” (id.).
But those benefits come with costs. For one, “doctors, teachers,
soldiers, and police are all potential purchasers of what others have to sell.
And the less money that they have, the less money I can charge them”
(id.). When policymakers consider these economic factors in the
aggregate, “mass unemployment” can become a major concern (p. 2).
Aiming to balance the potential costs and benefits of cheap robotic labor,
Pasquale offers a middle path: Some (but not all) jobs should be saved
from automation (p. 4). His argument focuses on the “professions,” which
he contends should be reserved for humans.
The vast amount of literature covered by Pasquale makes a clear
7

In highlighting these economic incentives, Pasquale builds off of his earlier
work. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1917 [hereinafter Data-Informed] (describing incentives
“to substitute [AI] and robotics for human labor”).
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definition of “profession” unavailable.8 He does offer a working definition
of the term, which is “capacious, and . . . include[s] many unionized
workers” (p. 5). Pasquale’s broad definition of “profession” thus includes
traditional professionals—such as lawyers, doctors, and engineers—as
well as new classes of professionals, each capable of “preserv[ing] certain
human values in health, education, journalism, policing, and many other
fields” (pp. 22, 171). Readers are left with the impression that, at bottom,
determining whether a particular occupation qualifies as a “profession”
requires determining whether the occupation amounts to a “fulfilling
vocation[]” (p. 4).
For Pasquale, human professionals are worth preserving from
automation because they “alleviat[e] classic tensions between technocracy
and popular rule” (id.). “The bargain at the core of professionalism,” he
writes, “is to empower workers to have some say in the organization of
production, while imposing duties upon them to advance the common
good” (id.). Thus, “local professionals” help promote important societal
benefits (p. 25). Throughout the book, Pasquale expresses his concern that
the societal benefits he attributes to human professionals may be
undermined should professional decision-making authority come to be
exercised by centralized algorithms.
The fundamental problem with professional automation, from
Pasquale’s perspective, is that algorithms seek to simplify complicated
professional judgments that are unfit for simplification (pp. 23–24).
“There is too much uncertainty in ordinary medical practice,” for example,
“to reduce it all to algorithms, which are commonly derided as ‘cookbook
medicine’” (p. 25). It would be better, he argues, to have different doctors
exercise independent professional judgments informed by growing
professional consensus (pp. 25, 44). More broadly, Pasquale expresses his
concern that, when attempting to replicate and automate human
professional judgment, “there is a temptation to simply set forth
quantifiable metrics of success . . . and to optimize algorithms to meet
them” (p. 28). This presents a problem because “the definition of what
counts as success or failure in [professional] fields is highly contestable”
(id.).9
8

This is in part a consequence of the book’s “balanced stance,” which Pasquale
recognizes “will disappoint both technophiles and technophobes” (p. 4). The
difficulty readers have in categorizing the book’s arguments as falling entirely on
any one side of any one debate is part of what makes the book such an enjoyable
read.
9
One example of a badly identified “success” involves identifying “successful”
medical patients using data suggesting “poorer patients do worse after organ
transplantation.” Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1923. Such patients’ relative
lack of success may be a result of income-related difficulties, not anything

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

144

Given the contested nature of defining successes and failures in
professional fields, automation risks giving roboticists and computer
scientists undue influence over some of society’s most important
decisions. In seeking to replicate complicated professional judgments in
computer code, roboticists and computer scientists can define successes
and failures pursuant to their own biases and motives.
Poorly replicating professional judgment in computer code can cut
short important professional disagreements that might otherwise crystalize
into professional consensus.10 There may be a need, then, to avoid
favoring the biases and motives of the relatively small number of
roboticists and computer scientists charged with replicating the
professional judgments of a larger class of varied professionals. Pasquale
proposes fulfilling that potential need by placing human professionals “at
the point of contact of AI—to meditate its effects, assure good data
collection, report errors, and do other vital work” (p. 28).
Pasquale’s efforts to keep human professionals “in the loop” are
intended to bring about a future where “doctors, nurses, teachers, home
health aides, journalists, and others . . . work with roboticists and computer
scientists, rather than meekly serving as data sources for their future
replacements” (pp. 2, 213). He would prefer a future of “distributed
expertise,” where “variation” in professional thought can be appropriately
“checked,” not a future where important professional decisions are made
uniformly by centralized algorithms (p. 24).11 His preference is in part
informed by equitable considerations, and it seeks to avoid a world where
human professionals are reserved for the wealthy (pp. 34, 57).12
indicating they are inherently bad patients from a medical perspective.
Nonetheless, “machine learning algorithms may conclude such patients are less
likely to benefit from further treatment—and recommend against it.” Id.
10
Consider the difficulty in replicating the legal profession’s evolving consensus
as to what a “successful” trial looks like; that definition of “success” must weigh
the competing requirements of the Sixth Amendment, which “lays out laborintensive conditions for a fair criminal trial that also has to occur quickly.” Calo,
supra note 2, at 414.
11
See also Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving
Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1243, 1252–53 (2017) [hereinafter Fourth Law] (arguing “no respectable
legal system” would replace the work of individual judges and clerks with a
“voice-parsing algorithm”); Frank Pasquale & Sandeep Vaheesan, Automation of
Labor, Labor of Automation, LPE PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/automation-of-labor-labor-of-automation/ (referring to
“distributed, in-person, democratized expertise”).
12
See also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 8 (2017) (“The
privileged . . . are processed more by people, the masses by machines.”); Rory
Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 564–65
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Human professionals can make mistakes, of course; Pasquale
freely admits as much (p. 5). But his concession does not undermine the
broader observation that the mistakes and biases associated with human
behavior are not magically avoided by automating professional judgment
(p. 39). Instead, human mistakes and biases shape the algorithms intended
to replicate professional thought.13 On this, Pasquale and I agree.14
Underpinning Pasquale’s overarching concern is a tradeoff
between (1) mistakes and biases attributable to human professionals
accountable to the local community members they serve, and (2) mistakes
and biases attributable to roboticists and computer scientists working in
far-away places behind complicated corporate structures. Because
“[d]istance frustrates accountability and threatens to obscure
responsibility in a haze of computation,” he posits that the mistakes and
biases of faceless roboticists and computer scientists should not be favored
over the mistakes and biases attributable to identifiable human
professionals leveraging “local knowledge” (pp. 24–25, 213).

B. Centralized Governmental Decision-Making Authority
Pasquale offers his four laws as a path to a better future, one not
overrun by centralized algorithmic decision-making. His laws, however,
are not self-actualizing. To be sure, he expects organized professional
associations to achieve much of his vision by voluntarily incorporating his
laws into new professional norms (pp. 34, 177). But private ordering will
quickly come up against the very economic pressures Pasquale outlines at
the start of his analysis.15
Those professional associations that adopt Pasquale’s laws will
increase their members’ labor costs, at least when measured against
robotic substitutes (p. 170). Given as much, there is likely to be some
hesitation to adopt newly crafted professional norms when there is no legal
obligation to do so, and when one’s competitors may not.16 In light of
these economic considerations, Pasquale implicitly acknowledges that, for
(2016) (“When a consumer reaches out about a dispute, computer algorithms . . .
estimate two main variables: behavior and net worth. . . . [That estimation]
predicts the likely response for that particular consumer . . . .”).
13
Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1924 (“Data are always socially shaped.”).
14
See Note, Chad Squitieri, Confronting Big Data: Applying the Confrontation
Clause to Government Data Collection, 101 VA. L. REV. 2011, 2031 (2015)
(“Different professions operate under different premises as to what counts as data,
and how data should be treated and relied on.”).
15
See supra Part I.A.
16
Pasquale describes the incentives facing individual firms as something of a
market failure, where “[i]ndividual market transactions are not . . . conducive to a
broader social good” (p. 175).
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his laws to have any real effect, they must become actual laws (i.e.,
government mandates). Indeed, Pasquale is clear in arguing that, by
regulating artificially intelligent technologies, “the state” can “better
protect the rights and prerogatives of workers” (p. 172). But as is central
to this Review, Pasquale is less clear as to which portions of “[t]he state”
he is referring.
In the United States, state power (i.e., governmental power) is split
between the federal government and state governments.
State
governments are in turn made up of political subcomponents exercising
various degrees of autonomy.17 Pasquale is of course familiar with this
concept of federalism. Indeed, he notes the relationship between
federalism and “subsidiarity,” the latter of which “commends a devolution
of responsibility to the most local entity capable of handling it well” (p.
176).18 His book’s single reference to federalism, however, is only offered
as something of an analogy from which lessons for the workplace can be
derived. To wit, Pasquale draws on the concept of federalism to argue that
“[m]aintaining human control over AI systems represents another form of
subsidiarity, more functional than territorial” (id.). He analogizes to
federalism to argue for “democracy in the workplace,” “local governance
by . . . professionals,” and “democratically governed communities of
expertise” (i.e., professional associations), but never explains why
federalism makes for good government in the first place (pp. 176, 187,
197).
Federalism produces two positive goods worth mentioning here.
First, federalism helps prevent tyranny. “[T]he genius” of the Framers was
to “split the atom of sovereignty” such that “citizens would have two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from
incursion by the other.”19 Because state governments and the federal
government exercise different authorities, no single government can wield
absolute power. Federalism thus protects individual liberties in a way
similar to the separation of federal powers.20 As James Madison put it,
17

It is frequently worthwhile to distinguish between local and state governments.
See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the Problem
of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2019). But in an effort to be succinct, this
Review uses the terms “state” and “local” interchangeably.
18
Pasquale also includes “sweeping preemption” within what he refers to as the
“Four Horsemen of Irresponsibility” (p. 40). This reference to preemption,
however, does not distinguish between federal and state power. Instead, the
reference addresses a concern that some regulatory proposals for AI would
“diminish the role of courts in the AI field, preempting their traditional role in
assigning blame for negligent conduct” (id.) (emphases added).
19
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
20
Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional
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federalism and the separation of powers offer the people “a double
security.”21
In addition to helping prevent tyranny, federalism helps promote
competition between governments, which can produce better policies.
Unlike a centralized government, where decisions to implement AI may
be made uniformly, federalism permits different states to take different
approaches. As Justice Brandeis famously explained: “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”22
Both the prevention of tyranny and the promotion of competition
suggest that state governments should play a key role in any effort to
enforce Pasquale’s four laws. As to the prevention of tyranny, developing
labor law was a responsibility historically reserved for state
governments—although that responsibility was altered in the wake of the
New Deal, when the federal government came to play a larger role in
regulating workplaces.23 That altering of the traditional balance between
federal and state power was supported by a broader interpretation of
Congress’s power to regulate commerce.24 For some, the growing
prevalence of AI may signal a need for an even stronger federal role.
Placing AI in historical context counsels against such an approach.
As Pasquale has elsewhere argued, AI represents only an
“evolution, not revolution” in technology.25 “In many cases, AI is little
more than a better-marketed form of statistics,” a method of analysis long
utilized by professionals.26 Those professionals, still today, remain closely
regulated by state governments.27 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
the “State[s] bear[] a special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of the licensed professions.”28
Should AI be used as a rationale for the federal government to
play a new, outsized role in overseeing the professions, policymakers may
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1418 (2008).
21
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
23
Paul R. Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 959–62 (1954).
24
Id. at 961 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
25
Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1919.
26
Id. at 1922.
27
Some argue that state professional regulations have become too prevalent,
creating a need for federal action. See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels
by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096, 1156 (2014).
28
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978).
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unknowingly usher in something of a Trojan Horse. As AI becomes a
regular feature in the modern workplace, a federal government with
outsized enforcement responsibilities would be able to assert itself more
aggressively in professional decision-making. And permitting federal
technocrats to more aggressively insert themselves between professionals
and their clients would seem to upset the very balance between
technocracy and popular rule that Pasquale identifies as a benefit of
professionalism (p. 4). To prevent that sort of unchecked federal
“incursion”29 into the arena of professional relationships, state
governments should play a leading role in any regulatory regime
addressing AI in the workplace.
As to promoting competition, introducing AI into the workplace
presents a moment ripe for state experimentation. There is little reason to
dictate the precise forms nascent technologies might evolve into when
different states can instead experiment with different regulatory regimes.30
If a uniform regulatory regime were to be selected, it should only be
selected after a period of percolation, during which time states’ relative
successes can be comparatively examined.31 Even if some states initially
choose “wrong” regulatory regimes, this would not merit premature
intervention by the federal government, which is at least just as likely to
choose “wrong” in the first instance.
States that initially choose “wrong” regulatory regimes are free to
change course after observing the relative successes enjoyed by states
utilizing different regimes. This point is not novel; the law has long
promoted regional variety in regulating professionals, even when it means
some localities may initially choose the “wrong” paths. The locality rule
in tort law, for example, requires physicians to provide patients the degree

29

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
See Adam Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology:
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation, 21
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8 (2015) (referring to “permissionless innovation”); Andrea
O’Sullivan, Don’t Let Regulators Ruin AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/10/24/3937/dont-let-regulators-ruinai/ (same); but see ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL
COMPETITION 224 (2016) (“Intervention should not be categorically set aside . . .
.”).
31
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism
and the Railroad Problem, 92 YALE L.J. 1017, 1034 (1988) (noting that
“extraordinary successful” state railroad regulations existed for “nearly a century”
before “federal policymakers” decided regulation was appropriate); Thierer,
supra note 30, at 9 (arguing for a “bottom-up” approach to “not preemptively
suffocate technological experimentation and innovation”).
30
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of skill that a reasonable physician in the same locality would provide.32
Throughout the book, Pasquale is (understandably) more focused
on the substance of his four laws than he is the procedure of how those
four laws might be enforced. When he does mention enforcement, he
suggests a federal-centric approach. “Because legislators cannot possibly
anticipate every situation that authorities may need to address,” he argues,
the “[n]ew laws of robotics should be . . . [enforced by] dedicated
regulators” that can “solicit expert advice” (pp. 3, 41). This reference to
“regulators” is left undefined, and thus could be a reference to state
regulators. But the benefits offered by state governments justify more than
a potential reference.
Moreover, Pasquale’s warning to avoid
“kneecap[ing] federal regulatory agencies” suggests that he has federal
regulators in mind (p. 40). Indeed, he specifically calls for “independent
. . . regulatory bodies,” (p. 131), and has elsewhere proposed that his four
laws be enforced by “independent agencies” like those created in “the New
Deal.”33
To be sure, Pasquale would carve out some role for “local entities
. . . to develop their own standards” (p. 41). But even if that is a reference
to local governments, rather than local professional associations, the
envisioned role is marginal at best. State governments can do more than
offer “granular” changes to regulations that are otherwise “harmonized
internationally or for a nation” (id.).
My critique of Pasquale’s relative silence as to who should
enforce his four laws constitutes more than an idiosyncratic reader’s
request for additional information. I readily acknowledge that there is only
so much one author (at least one human author) can fit in a single book.
Pasquale cannot be expected to explain every nook and cranny of his
proposal. But the proper division of governmental power is a core
consideration in evaluating the correctness of the book’s overall
proposal.34 Because Pasquale so masterfully highlights the benefits of
promoting subsidiarity when it comes to professional decision-making, he
prepares readers to expect a similarly commanding analysis of the benefits
of promoting federalism when it comes to governmental decision-making.
His relative silence as to enforcement and federalism is therefore notable.
Throughout the book, there are instances when offering more
detail about enforcement would have resulted in a more complete
32

Marc Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives! Why? Using Modern Medicine to
Eradicate an “Unhealthy” Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 323 (2013) (citing Kaiser
v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965)).
33
Been, supra note 6.
34
See Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 1070 (“An important part of any theory of
regulation is the identification of the optimal regulatory sovereign.”).
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argument. Consider again Pasquale’s suggestion that, for an occupation
to be worth preserving for human labor, the occupation must be a
“fulfilling vocation[]” (p. 4). It is crucial for local government officials to
play a role in making that determination, or at least just as crucial as the
need (which Pasquale identifies) for professionals to play a role in defining
successes and failures within their own professions (p. 28).
A federal regulator in Washington, D.C. might determine that a
West Virginia coal miner and a Massachusetts fisherman perform
“dangerous or degrading” work unfit for humans (p. 4). But local
government officials, by comparison, may readily recognize that certain
miners and fishermen find significant fulfillment in their jobs. Perhaps
they find fulfillment in performing work that connects them to family
members from past generations, or work connecting them to a prized
natural resource unique to their home state. This is not to say that every
miner and fisherman enjoys such fulfillment; it is unlikely that such a
blanket statement could be made about any occupation. But it is to say
that determining which occupations qualify as being worth preserving for
human labor is a determination that would benefit from input by local
officials.
Pasquale’s relative silence on enforcement and federalism is also
notable because the technological advances encouraging a centralization
of professional judgment are some of the same advances encouraging a
centralization of governmental power. Consider the driverless car.
Traditionally, automobile speeds have been established by state and local
governments targeting human drivers.35 In setting speed limits, local
officials could consider a wide set of factors, including safety, the needs
of industry, and urban planning goals. A key route connecting two
markets, for example, might be assigned a relatively high speed limit in
order to facilitate trade—save for a few miles where officials determine
that speeds should be reduced so as to limit unwelcome noise, or where
slower speeds might encourage patronage at local establishments.
Locally established speed limits may be eliminated, however,
when a national set of regulations targeting driving technologies can
replace localized sets of regulations targeting human drivers. Technology
empowering driverless cars, after all, could be programmed with
nationwide maps pre-set with speed limits designed to achieve national
prerogatives. Sure, driverless cars could be programmed to respect locally
set speed limits to the extent that federal law does not preempt them. But
once it is determined that speed limits are a proper federal concern, is there
any doubt that local speed limits will be preempted?
35

See Frederick K. Beutel, Law Making by Professional and Trade Associations,
34 NEB. L. REV. 431, 432 (1955).
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How much influence, for example, would local home and business
owners in Topeka, Kansas have in shaping national speed limit legislation
identifying Topeka (and dozens of other towns) as existing along a key
trade route between New York and Los Angeles? Would those local home
and business owners have more or less influence than they would if their
speed limits were set by local officials who drive on the very roads they
regulate? One need not be an expert in Topeka politics to have informed
answers to those questions.
Driverless cars offer just one example of a broader trend. Similar
mismatches between local interests and national decision-making can arise
in other contexts. Do we need doctors in Appalachia when it may be more
efficient for a robot to collect medical information from a patient, send the
information to Boston to be analyzed on cutting-edge equipment, and have
a diagnosis delivered back to Appalachia? As “smart contracts”
proliferate with the promise of automatically enforceable agreements
based on software programmed in San Francisco, do we really need judges
and lawyers in Reno? And what happens to state licensing associations
(and the state tort law they help create) when it becomes possible to
regulate legal and medical technologies on a national level, rather than
regulate human lawyers and doctors on a regional basis?
These hypotheticals present complex questions requiring complex
answers. In one sense, individuals in Appalachia or Reno might prefer to
have their medical information analyzed and contracts drafted by
advanced algorithms designed and controlled elsewhere. On the other
hand, the widespread adoption of those preferences reduces the ability for
doctors and lawyers to make a living in Appalachia and Reno, where those
professionals might have otherwise provided personalized services
difficult to replicate by machine.
There is something to be said about receiving diagnostic
information from a human capable of expressing empathy in person, or
having a will drafted by a neighbor who personally understands the
subjective value assigned to each heirloom. Pasquale agrees that those
types of values are worth preserving (pp. 25, 33, 65), but he does not argue
for the type of federalist regulatory structure that can ensure that those
values are preserved.36 State and local governments can play a critical role
in ensuring that values associated with human professionalism are
36

The need to affirmatively develop a federalist regulatory structure is highlighted
by recent history in the data privacy space. In that space, a single federal
agency—the Federal Trade Commission—“has become the broadest and most
influential regulatory force . . . in the United States—more so than nearly any
privacy statute or common law tort.” Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The
FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86
(2014).
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protected, but that role is at risk of extinction if the wisdom of our
federalist system is not carried forward into the algorithmic age.
II. FOUR LAWS
The remainder of this Review examines each of Pasquale’s four
laws in greater detail. In doing so, I offer recommendations as to how each
law could be enforced so as to best account for the benefits of federalism.
My recommendations are not incompatible with Pasquale’s thesis. To the
contrary, it is my hope that Pasquale and others will utilize these
recommendations to expand upon the arguments offered in New Laws of
Robotics.

A. Complement Not Replace
Pasquale’s first law provides that robotic systems and AI should
complement professionals, not replace them (p. 3). “While economic
imperatives will pressure” employers “to substitute software” for humans,
“professional associations should ensure that cost considerations are
balanced against the many virtues of direct human involvement” (pp. 33–
34). Pasquale argues that striking the right balance requires determining
how to utilize both AI and “intelligence augmentation,” or IA; IA
describes the use of technologies (such as information sensors) to better
inform human decisions (p. 13).
Technologists have long aspired to create “[s]trong” or
“[g]eneral” AI “with abilities that meet or surpass human-level
cognition.”37 But current AI excels only “in narrow, limited settings . . .
where there are clear right or wrong answers.”38 Because humans and
robots have different strengths and weaknesses, Pasquale contends that
“[j]oint working” (i.e., work involving both AI and a human professional)
can be “more valuable than either working alone” (p. 37).
Pasquale’s “joint working” proposal can be naturally extended to
inform who should enforce his first law. Like humans and robots, the
federal and state governments have different strengths and weaknesses.
While the federal government is well-positioned to establish uniform (if
generalized) standards, state governments are better positioned to leverage
localized knowledge to develop standards tailored to local circumstances.
Different professionals in different locations can appropriately use new
37

Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1305, 1308–09 (2019).
38
Id. at 1309. Pasquale highlights this point with a medical example: “Narrow
AI for detecting polyps . . . might ‘see’ a problem polyp that no gastroenterologist
would, but it might also be incapable of recognizing other abnormalities that it
was not trained to detect” (p. 37).
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technologies in different ways. There need not be a rigid national standard
governing how professionals will incorporate new technologies into varied
workplaces. Instead, state officials, who already have a “special
responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed
professions,”39 should continue to play a “special” role in enforcing
Pasquale’s first law. To understand how, consider an example Pasquale
offers concerning clinical decision support software, or “CDSS” (id.).
By monitoring patient conditions and prescriptions, CDSS can
alert physicians to potentially problematic combinations (id.). “Ongoing
regulation will be critical,” Pasquale argues, “to assure that patients will
have the benefits of [this] cutting-edge technology, without burdening
doctors and nurses” (id.). The “ideal” situation would be one where CDSS
is “neither overbearing nor merely a quiescent watcher of practitioners”
(id.). CDSS should therefore be “continually calibrated,” he proposes, so
that “physicians, nurses, and pharmacists actually welcome its use, and
have ongoing opportunities to critique and improve it” (p. 38).
Pasquale smartly proposes that individual physicians, nurses, and
pharmacists play a continual role in shaping software—those professionals
have the on-the-ground expertise needed to ensure that software remains
useful (id.). But he does not offer insight as to who should promulgate the
“[o]ngoing regulation” that is “critical” to ensuring that those
professionals play a continuous role in shaping CDSS (p. 37). Regularly
taking physicians, nurses, and pharmacists from their work to update
software is bound to be costly for hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies;
governmental incentives may be necessary. State governments, which are
already familiar with the peculiarities of the professionals they supervise,
are best positioned to create those incentives. Indeed, state governments
can engage in the “sector by sector” approach Pasquale deems necessary
for striking the best balances between human and machine (p. 14). The
federal government, by comparison, is more prone to offer the “one-sizefits-all model of technological advance” that Pasquale correctly dismisses
(id.).
In short, there is little need to reinvent the wheel to enforce
Pasquale’s first law. States already play a special role in overseeing
professional associations, which in turn influence how professionals
utilize all sorts of technologies. There may be a role for the federal
government to play when national interests are at stake and one of the
federal government’s enumerated powers is applicable. But the mere fact
that artificially intelligent software is involved does not mean that the
federal government’s regulatory role should be all-encompassing. A
contrary position would risk, to paraphrase a popular phrase, allowing the
39

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978).
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regulation of software to eat federalism.40

B. Counterfeiting Humanity
Pasquale’s second law provides that robotic systems and AI
should not counterfeit humanity (p. 7). “As engineers scramble to finetune [technologies] . . . creating pictures of ‘fake people,’ and convincing
synthetic voices,” Pasquale asks: “Do we want to live in a world where
human beings do not know whether they are dealing with a fellow human
or a machine?” (id.). He answers that question with a straightforward no,
which he defends with two justifications.
First, the “transition” to a “world of robots indistinguishable from
humans . . . entails massive surveillance of humans” (p. 8). Second, “[t]he
voice or face of another human being demands respect and concern,” while
“machines have no such claim on our conscience” (id.). Thus, to avoid
massive surveillance and an improper anthropomorphization of machines,
Pasquale’s second law would maintain a distinction between humans and
robots. In doing so, his second law promotes values advanced by his
fourth law (discussed below) by ensuring that humans are not lulled into
assigning rights (e.g., free expression) and responsibilities (e.g., tort
liability) to robots.41
State-sanctioned professional associations have long prohibited
their members from engaging in acts of deception, a category of behavior
that would seem to comfortably cover Pasquale’s conception of human
counterfeiting. Legal professional rules, for example, prohibit solo
practitioners from implying that they are part of a law partnership.42 One
can imagine an analogous rule prohibiting a robot from deceptively
suggesting that it is human.
As with enforcing Pasquale’s first law, then, there is little need to
reinvent the wheel when it comes to enforcing his second law. As new
and existing categories of professionals begin to incorporate AI into their
work, state-sanctioned professional associations can establish industry and
state specific rules to ensure that professionals do not engage in deceptive
40

C.f. Marc Andreesen, Why Software Is Eating The World, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512
250915629460 (referring to the “phenomenon of software eating a traditional
business”).
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Infra Part II.D; see also Data-Informed, supra note 7, at 1918 (discussing “AI
‘personhood’”).
42
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 7.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001) (“Lawyers
may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only
when that is the fact.”); see also Kathryn A. Thompson, Naming Rights and
Wrongs, ABA J. (Dec. 4, 2004), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/naming_rights_and_wrongs.
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forms of human counterfeiting.
As already described, professional rules can increase the cost of
providing professional services.43 It is therefore critical that different
states and different professions have the flexibility to focus on some rules
rather than others. State X, when regulating Profession X, may deem it
imprudent to expend regulatory resources and raise the cost of professional
services in order to target a type of behavior that is only problematic in
Profession Y or State Y. State-sanctioned professional associations are
best positioned to establish the basket of rules best designed to balance the
costs and benefits of embracing a particular technology. Federally
established professional rules, by comparison, are less able to adjust for
such professional or geographic differences.
This is not to say that federal standards should be shunned
entirely. Legal professional rules—which include model national rules
and state-specific alterations—again offer an example framework. An
American Bar Association (“ABA”) model professional rule prohibits
lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or
misrepresentation.”44 Some state bar associations have opted to adopt the
ABA’s model rule as written.45 Others have enacted the rule with unique
changes.46 Additional regional variety can be found in how state bar
associations interpret their rules when applying them to the unique facts
and circumstances arising within their jurisdictions.47 This framework
could be readily extended to address the types of deception targeted by
Pasquale’s second law, which might arise differently in different
professional contexts.

C. Arms Races
Pasquale’s third law provides that robotic systems and AI should
not intensify zero-sum arms races (p. 9). Traditionally, the judgment of
military professionals has been relied upon (within democratic constraints)
when military decisions are made. But, where human decision-making
moves too slowly and countries feel pressured to adopt the newest forms
of automated weaponry, pushbutton wars can become a concern (p. 154).
43

Supra Part I.B.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).
45
See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PRO. RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (22 NYCRR
1200.3).
46
See, e.g., OREGON RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3), (b) (clarifying “it shall
not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to
supervise lawful covert activity”).
47
See David L. Hudson Jr., Split intensifies over prosecutors’ ethical disclosure
duties, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 8:30 CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/
web/article/split-over-prosecutors-ethical-disclosure-duties-intensifies.
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Such wars can result when countries program their weapons to respond to
perceived threats, and adversarial countries program their own weapons to
respond in kind.48 As a result, an escalating series of tits-for-tats can be
set in motion with minimal opportunity for human involvement.
Pasquale’s third law is a natural one for the federal government to
enforce. Indeed, federal enforcement would promote some of the
fundamental principles that resulted in American federalism. Fearful that
European sovereigns would rip the newly-formed United States apart if
individual states were permitted to enter into their own international
alliances, the Framers ensured that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance or Confederation,”49 and that “[n]o State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a
foreign Power.”50
As John Jay wrote, “[i]t is of high importance to the peace of
America that she observe the laws of nations . . . [and] it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three
or four distinct confederacies.”51 By adopting treaties to address
artificially intelligent weaponry, the federal government can work to avoid
unnecessary, automated warfare. By comparison, states would upset
fundamental principles of federalism should they interfere with foreign
relations—an objectively federal prerogative.
Pasquale’s third law, moreover, is not limited to military
operations. This law can also reduce the incentive for private companies
to continually one-up each other with increasingly pervasive forms of data
collection (pp. 143–44).52 To the extent Pasquale’s third law might be
enforced in such a fashion, federal enforcement could promote
fundamental conceptions of federalism.
Federal enforcement of Pasquale’s third law can harmonize data
collection standards across the country. Doing so could avoid an
alternative where states face incentives from locally headquartered
companies to permit more profitable forms of collection in order to
compete with competitors headquartered elsewhere. And even if states
wished to establish a uniform standard themselves, their agreement to do
48
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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See also FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY 4 (2015) (“As technology
advances, market pressures raise the stakes of the data game.”).
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so would require federal approval. As the Constitution provides, “[n]o
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State.”53 In short, the federal government is best
positioned to enforce Pasquale’s third law, which calls for uniform
standards across jurisdictions.

D. The Duty to Identify
Pasquale’s fourth and final law provides that robotic systems and
AI must always indicate the identity of their creators, controllers, and
owners (p. 11).54 This can help maintain legal accountability for flawed
robotics, such as a medical app that misdiagnoses a rash (pp. 64–65).
As Pasquale would have it, a robotic duty to identify would be a
duty East Coast Code (i.e., statutory and regulatory law) requires to be
enacted directly within West Coast Code (i.e., software language).55
“Regulators will need to require responsibility-by-design,” Pasquale
argues, and those regulators should consider “requiring certain hard-coded
audit logs, or licensing practices that explicitly contemplate problematic
outcomes” (p. 12). He stresses that such regulation must come early, so
that it can “influence systems development by foreclosing some design
options and encouraging others” (id.).
Pasquale’s intention to shape nascent technologies weighs heavily
in favor of assigning enforcement responsibilities to state governments, at
least for the moment.56 As mentioned above, one of the benefits of
federalism is that different states can experiment with different regulatory
regimes and learn from experience.57 As technologies develop and it
becomes apparent which regulatory regimes work best, states can change
course and leverage the lessons offered by other states. The federal
government, too, can learn from state regulatory experiments when
creating its own regime after technology has matured.58
If the federal government, however, were to prematurely select a
uniform regulatory regime, technological developments may be forever
tainted. This may make it impossible to determine whether the “correct”
53

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
See also Fourth Law, supra note 11, at 1252–53 (“[W]e may need to ensure that
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regulatory regime was chosen or whether a different regime would have
better balanced the relative costs and benefits. State governments, which
are already familiar with identification regimes such as driver’s licenses
and license plates,59 as well as professional disclosure requirements such
as those stemming from fiduciary responsibilities,60 are best positioned to
take the initial lead in enforcing Pasquale’s fourth law.

CONCLUSION
In New Laws of Robotics, Frank Pasquale proposes four laws
designed to ensure that important societal decisions remain informed by
human professional judgment. In this Review I recommended how, if his
four laws are to be enforced, they might be enforced so as to best promote
principles of federalism. It is my hope that Pasquale and others will
incorporate these recommendations as they build upon his remarkable
contribution.
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